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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR TEXT. PARA S 1, 5 AND 6.

DEPT PLEASE PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: PINCUS/PAUL VISIT

1. THE PINCUS-PAUL VIST TO BONN INCLUDED A DINNER
SESSION WITH THE DCM, AN HOUR'S TALK WITH AMBASSADOR
RUSH, THREE HOURS CONFERENCE WITH DCM AND EMBASSY STAFF
MEMBERS, AND A LUNCH BY AHBASSADOR RUSH. HE MAIN TOPICS
IN ORDER RAISED BY PINCUS AND PAUL WERE:

2. BRANDT'S EASTERN POLICY: BOTH PINCUS AND PAUL ASKED

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REPEATED QUESTIONS CONCERNING BRANDT'S ALLEGIANCE TO THE WEST, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR BRANDT'S EASTERN POLICY, ITS CHANCES OF SUCCESS AND THE OUTCOME IF IT WERE SUCCESSFUL. WE REPLIED THAT BRANDT'S GOVERNMENT FIRMLY ANCHORED IN WEST AND BRANDT REALISTIC RE PROSPECT FOR EASTERN POLICY. WE SAID PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EASTERN POLICY WAS HIGH AND THAT CHANCES OF SUCCESS DEPENDED ON SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN ESTIMATES OF POLITICAL COSTS TO THEIR OWN SYSTEMS. WE OBSERVED THAT NO CONCLUSIVE ESTIMATE COULD BE MADE OF PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS AND THAT EVEN IF POLITICAL AGREEMENTS WERE CONCLUDED WITH THE SOVIET UNION, POLAND AND THE GDR, THIS WOULD NOT BEING A DECISIVE CHANGE IN THE EAST-WEST SITUATION IN EUROPE BUT WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY BRANDT AND OTHER GERMAN LEADERS TO BE ONE STEP IN A PROCESS WHICH MIGHT LAST GENERATION.

3. EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. PINCUS ASKED US TO REVIEW GERMAN AND AMERICAN POSITIONS ON A POSSIBLE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THEM. WE SAID THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE. BOH WANTED PROSPECT FOR WELL-PREPARED CONFERENCE WITH REASONABLE OUTLOOK FOR SUCCESS BEFORE MAKING ANY FINAL DECISIONS. GERMANS WERE POLITE IN THEIR PUBLIC TREATMENT OF THIS TOPIC IN ORDER TO AVOID OFFENSE TO THE SOVIETS; THEIR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION DID NOT DIFFER FROM OURS.

4. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS FROM PAUL ON THE ODER-NEISS ISSUE, WE SAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE POLISH AND GERMAN POSITIONS WAS THAT THE POLES APPARENTLY DESIRED A FULLY DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT, WHILE THE GERMANS FELT OBLIGED BY THEIR CONCERN FOR GERMANY AS A WHOLE TO LEAVE OPEN THE PROSPECT OF CONFIRMATION OF AN AGREEMENT IN A FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT. WE SAID OUR OWN POLICY ON THE ODER-NEISSE WAS THAT FINAL SETTLEMENT WAS RESERVED TO A PEACE TREATY BUT THAT WE FULLY SUPPORTED EFFORTS OF BOTH SIDES TO COME TO AGREEMENT NOW. PINCUS ASKED WHETHER OTHER POSSIBILITIES FOR OVERALL SOLUTION OF THE GERMAN QUESTION COULD BE CONCEIVED. WE REPLIED THAT GERMAN POLITICAL LEADERS HAD ABANDONED THE EARLIER SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATING FORMULA TO SOLVE THE GERMAN QUESTION AND HAVE INSTEAD ADOPTED THE CONCEPT OF PROMOTING LONG-TERM EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE WHILE RAISING NO QUESTIONS ABOUT CONTINUING GDR MEMBERSHIP IN THE WARSAW PACT AND THEMSELVES REMAINING FIRMLY LINKED TO NATO.

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5. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS, WE SAID SOVIET PRESUMABLY WISHED TO PREVENT ESTABLISHMENT OF A POTENTIAL RIVAL CENTER OF POWER IN WESTERN EUROPE,

GERMANS VIEW THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS BASE FOR THEIR OWN PROSPERITY AND SECURITY AND A SUCCESSFUL LONG-TERM EASTERN POLICY, WHILE OTHER MEMBERS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WISH TO ACHIEVE MORE EQUAL STATUS IN THE WORLD, DECREASING THE POWER DISCREPANCY SEPARATING THEM FROM THE SUPERPOWERS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS SERIES OF QUESTIONS WAS APPARENTLY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER CHANGES IN MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN SITUATION WERE EXPECTED.

6. MILITARY ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST BALANCE. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF MILITARY ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST BALANCE. WE SAID SOVIET FORCES IN EAST GERMANY WERE AMONG THE MOST HIGHLY TRAINED IN THE WORLD WITH NEW AND MODERN EQUIPMENT. RAPID MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY OF SOVIET UNITS IN LOWER STATE OF READINESS WAS NOTED.

7. ON POLITICAL ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST BALANCE, WE NOTED KEY POSITION OF GERMANY IN EUROPE. WE WISH TO DENY GERMAN HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES TO THE SOVIETS; THE SOVIETS WISH TO GAIN INCREASED INFLUENCE OVER THEM. WE SAID THE MAINTENANCE OF GERMAN CONFIDENCE IN US POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT WAS A NECESSARY ELEMENT IN THE GERMAN CAPACITY TO WITHSTAND SOVIET POLITICAL PRESSURES. IF IT DID NOT EXIST TO A SUFFICIENT EXTENT, THE SUPERIORITY OF SOVIET GROUND AND NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD OF ITSELF AFFECT THE DECISIONS OF GERMAN AND OTHER EUROPEAN POLITICAL LEADERS. A SITUATION COULD THEN ARISE IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD GAIN INCREASING INFLUENCE OVER GERMAN DECISIONS.

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ON WAYS OF MAKING DECREASES PALATABLE FOR GERMAN
OPINION.

9. CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF US FORCE WITHDRAWALS, WE POINTED OUT THAT PAST GERMAN UNEASINESS WAS AUGMENTED BY THREE NEW FACTORS: THE NEW DEMONSTRATION IN PRAGUE OF THE WILLINGNESS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO USE MILITARY FORCE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES; MOVE OF SOVIET UNION TOWARDS NUCLEAR EQUALITY WITH US, AND OBSERVATION BY GERMANS OF TRENDS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL OPINION TOWARDS FOREIGN POLICY DISENGAGEMENT AND SIGNS OF LACK OF COHESION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY. CONSEQUENTLY, REDUCTIONS NOW MIGHT HAVE STILL GREATER IMPACT ON GERMAN CONFIDENCE IN US THAN IN THE PAST.

10. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A REPEATED EFFORT WAS MADE BY PINCUS AND PAUL TO ELICIT CONTENT OF ANGLO-GERMAN PNG PAPER ON THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND, MORE GENERALLY, TO FIND AREAS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GERMAN AND AMERICAN VIEWS ON NUCLEAR STRATEGY. WE DECLINED COMMENT ON NUCLEAR POLICY, STATING THIS WAS NATO QUESTION AND NOT POLITICAL ISSUE HERE. WE SAID GERMAN PUBLIC HAD ANTIPATHY TO DISCUSSION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF ANY KIND BUT AT THE SAME TIME SUPPORTED THE STATIONING OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. GERMAN GOVERNMENT FULLY SUPPORTED NATO CONCEPTS OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

11. PAST AND INTENDED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE GERMAN DEFENSE EFFORT. PINCUS AND PAUL INQUIRED ABOUT THE GERMAN REACTION TO THE CZECH CRISIS, THE ANNOUNCED REDEPLOYMENT OF THE BRITISH SIXTH BRIGADE TO THE BAOR, AND THE 1967 TRILATERAL TALKS. IN REPLY TO THEIR QUESTIONS, WE GAVE THEM INFORMAL TENTATIVE ESTIMATE OF BOP SAVINGS FROM TRILATERAL AT 59 MILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY. THEY ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE SPECIFIC STEPS TAKEN BY FRG AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO IMPROVE THE BUNDESWEHR'S COMBAT EFFICIENCY. WE POINTED OUT THAT THE GERMANS HAVE BEEN INCREASING THEIR DEFENSE BUDGET IN MONETARY TERMS AND TRYING TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THE BUNDESWEHR, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS MORALE, MATERIAL AND ORGANIZATION. WE NOTED THEY COULD OBTAIN MORE COMPARATIVE DETAIL ON THIS SUBJECT AT USNATO. THE THRUST OF QUESTIONS HERE WAS, EVERYONE MENTIONS THE NEED FOR THE EUROPEANS TO DO MORE IN THEIR OWN DEFENSE; WHAT ADDITIONAL THINGS HAVE

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THEY DONE OR ARE THEY LIKELY TO DO TO TAKE MORE OF THE BURDEN ON THEIR OWN SHOULDERS?

12. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE GERMAN DEFENSE BUDGET. PINCUS AND PAUL INQUIRED ABOUT THE INFLATIONARY PRESSURES IN GERMANY, THE INFLATIONARY EFFECTS OF A DEFENSE BUDGET INCREASE AND THE GENERAL BUDGETARY OUTLOOK. THEY SHOWED CRITICAL INTEREST IN THE BLOCKING OF DM 1.1 BILLION OF 1970 DEFENSE BUDGET. THE EMBASSY POINTED OUT THAT INFLATIONARY PRESSURES WERE SOMEWHAT GREATER THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED AND THAT THE THREE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES AGREE ON THE URGENCY OF ACHIEVING PRICE STABILITY AND HOLDING THE BUDGET AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL. THIS, ALONG WITH SOCIAL REFORMS TO WHICH THIS GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED, MEANS THAT THE DEFENSE BUDGET WILL PROBABLY REMAIN AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL.

13. ON OFFSET, WE REPLIED THAT MILITARY PROCUREMENT IS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO US THAN FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS, EVEN WHEN THESE ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVED PREFERRED RATES OF INTEREST AND LONGER-TERM LOANS. THEY ASKED FOR OUR ESTIMATE OF A POSSIBLE GERMAN BUDGETARY CONTRIBUTION TO OFFICIAL EXPENDITURES OF U.S. FORCES IN GERMANY. WE REVIEWED PAST BACKGROUND ON THIS, MENTIONED NEGATIVE ATTITUDES OF MINISTERS MOELLER AND SCHMIDT AND SAID THAT THIS ISSUE WAS JUST BEGINNING TO BE BROACHED IN POLITICAL CIRCLES HERE, HENCE IT WAS TOO EARLY TO EVALUATE ITS CHANCES OF ACCEPTANCE. WE REFERRED TO GERMAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS IN JANUARY.

14. OTHER QUESTIONS RAISED AND BRIEFLY TOUCHED ON WERE: SOVIET FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE GDR WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET FORCES IN EAST GERMANY; (WE SAID NO INFORMATION HERE; PERHAPS IN WASHINGTON) CONSEQUENCES OF FRENCH MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO FOR CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE OF EUROPE; (WE SAID GERMANS NOT GREATLY CONCERNED TODAY) TRENDS OF GERMAN ARMS PURCHASES IN THE U.S.; (WE SAID NOT POSSIBLE GIVE MEANINGFUL PROJECTIONS) THE COST TO THE U.S. OF MAINTAINING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GERMANY (NO ANSWER) AND QUADRIPARTITE BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS, (WE GAVE BRIEF FACTUAL DESCRIPTION OF STATUS).

15. PAUL HAD ONE-HOUR CONVERSATION WITH THEO SOMMER, CHRISTOPHER

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BERTRAM AND HANS-GEORG WIECK OF FMOD'S PLANNING STAFF. CONVERSATION COVERED EASTERN POLICY ON LINES SIMILAR TO EMBASSY BRIEFING, AND US FORCES. IN RESPONSE TO PAUL'S QUESTIONS, SOMMER AND COLLEAGUES SAID : (A) NATO MEANS FOR THE FRG AN ALLIANCE WITH THE US; (B) LEVEL OF US FORCES IN EUROPE CONSTITUTE MEASUREMENT NOT ONLY OF US CAPABILITIES BUT ALSO OF GERMAN CONFIDENCE THAT US WOULD IF CALLED UPON MEET ITS NATO COMMITMENT; (C) WHATEVER US MAY FEEL COMPELLED TO DO AS REGARDS TO TROOP LEVEL ISSUE, IT SHOULD GET A QUID PRO QUO FROM THE USSR; (D) ONE GETS FEELING THAT DISCUSSIONS IN NATO ON MBFR ARE BEING UNDULY STRUNG OUT BY THE US AND THAT EVEN A ONE-FOR-ONE APPROACH TO MBFR WOULD BE BETTER THAN A UNILATERAL US WITHDRAWAL; AND (E) EFFECT OF US REDUCTIONS ON THE GERMANS AND OTHER WESTERN EUROPEANS WOULD PROBABLY BE A SLOW CRUMBLING OF CONFIDENCE IN US RATHER THAN SOMETHING MORE

#OMISSION

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.
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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY RABAT
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RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 135
AMEMBASSY PARIS

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SUBJECT: PINCUS/PAUL VISIT

16. KINDS OF QUESTIONS ASKED BY PINCUS AND PAUL:
(A) BURDEN SHARING - HOW DOES FRG REGARD WHAT ITS SHARE OF
DEFENSE BURDEN SHOULD BE AND WHAT IS ITS PROGRAM FOR BURDEN
SHARING? WHAT ARE POLITICAL/ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS TO GREATER FRG
DEFENSE EFFORTS? WHAT ARE CAUSES OF CURRENT GERMAN INFLATION?
WHAT ARE RELATIVE ADVANTAGES TO US OF APPROACHING OFFSET VIA
DEFENSE PURCHASES VERSUS FISCAL MEASURES?
(B) TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS- WHAT DOES HELMUT SCHMIDT THINK
OF THEIR ROLE? WHAT WAS UK/FRG INITIATIVE ON ROLE OF SUCH WEAPONS

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TO WHICH HEALEY RECENTLY REFERRED? HOW DO GERMANS REGARD PRESENCE OF SUCH WEAPONS IN FEDREP? HOW WOULD GERMANS REACT TO PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED REDUCTION, OR TO AN INCREASE ACCOMPANIED BY US TROOP REDUCTION? WHAT IS COST TO US OF MAINTAINING SUCH WEAPONS IN FRG? (C) EASTERN AND GERMAN POLICY- WHAT ARE US AND FRG VIEWS ON AN ESC? WHAT DO GERMANS SEEK IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS, POLES, GDR? WHY DID WE SEEK BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS? DO GERMANS THINK THEIR POSITION COULD BE IMPROVED BY A CHANGE IN THEIR NATO RELATIONSHIP?

(D) THREAT - HOW DO GERMANS RELATE US TROOP PRESENCE, IN TERMS OF DETTENCE AND OF ACTUAL DEFENSE, IN THESE SITUATIONS? DELIBERATE PACT ATTACK, AN UNWANTED WAR, A PROBE-TYPE SITUATION, AND NON-MILITARY SOVIET AGRANDIZEMENT IN SHADOW OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCE?

(E) US FORCES - HOW DOES FRG REGARD US ASSURANCE ON MAINTENANCE OF OUR FORCES THROUGH MID-1971? IF US CUTS ARE TO BE MADE, WHAT ARE FRG VIEWS AS TO MILITARILY MOST RATIONAL AND POLITICALLY MOST ACCEPTABLE WAYS TO DO SO? HOW WOULD FRG REGARD US UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF OUR AIR DEFENSE UNITS? HOW PREPARED ARE GERMANS FOR US TROOP CUTS? HOW DO THEY REGARD THE VIETNAM PRECEDENT? WHAT IS GERMAN CONCEPTION OF US OVERSEAS FORCE POSTURE IN POST-VIETNAM PERIOD? WHAT ATTENTION DO GERMANS GIVE MANSFIELD RESOLUTION? (F) FRANCE- WHAT WAS EFFECT ON GERMAN'S APPRECIATION OF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES OF FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO'S INTEGRATED DEFENSE STRUCTURES, AT THAT TIME AND IN RETROSPECT? DO THE GERMANS NOW THINK FRANCE WOULD PARTICIPATE IN A NATO WAR?

(G) WHAT IS TREND IN FRG INTEREST IN THE REST OF THE WORLD? DO WE WANT WESTERN EUROPE TO BE A MORE EQUAL PARTNER? WHY?

17. PAPERS GIVEN TO PINCUS AND PAUL WERE: (A) FACT SHEET ON GERMANY; (B) PUBLISHED DATA ON GERMAN ARMS PURCHASES FOR RECENT YEARS; (C) PUBLISHED FIGURES ON GERMAN DEFENSE BUDGET FOR YEARS 1968, 1969 AND 1970; (D) BREAKDOWN ON 1969 OFFSET AGREEMENT FROM PUBLISHED FIGURES? (E) SUMMARY ON GERMAN APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES; AND (F) SUMMARY ON GERMAN ARMED FORCES. COPIES BEING POUCHED. AIRGRAM FOLLOWS:

RUSH

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